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LOCAL PREFERENCES IN AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING: SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR 
THOSE WHO LIVE OR WORK IN A 
MUNICIPALITY? 
Keaton Norquist* 
Abstract: Local governments are increasingly granting preference to local 
residents and employees when selecting occupants for affordable housing 
set-asides. These preferences risk being invalidated for three reasons. First, 
courts could view the preferences as a penalty on non-residents’ funda-
mental right to travel and migration. Second, preferences implemented 
with the intention of excluding protected classes of persons could violate 
the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, preferences could violate the Federal 
Fair Housing Act by creating or perpetuating discriminatory racial impacts.  
In order to avoid these legal risks, this Note proposes that local govern-
ments should structure their affordable housing selection programs as 
broadly and inclusively as possible.  Specifically, local governments should: 
(1) offer multiple ways for an applicant to receive preference; (2) base the 
preferences on an expanded geographic area beyond the local govern-
ment's particular jurisdictional boundaries; and (3) limit the scope and du-
ration of the preferences. 
Introduction 
 A shortage and uneven distribution of affordable housing has 
plagued local governments for decades.1 It is a problem that threatens 
the economic, environmental, and general quality of life in cities and 
counties across the nation.2 Local governments have reacted to the prob-
                                                                                                                        
* Executive Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2008–09. 
The author would like to thank William B. Fulton for his guidance and suggestion of this 
Note topic. Mr. Fulton is the President of Solimar Research Group and a Senior Scholar at 
the School of Policy, Planning, & Development at the University of Southern California. 
1 See James B. Goodno, Affordable Housing: Who Pays Now?, Planning, Nov. 2002, at 4, 4–
6. See generally Nico Calavita & Kenneth Grimes, Inclusionary Housing in California: The Experi-
ence of Two Decades, 64 J. Am. Plan. Ass’n, Spring 1998, at 150 (discussing the history of in-
clusionary housing in California). 
2 See David Dillon, Earning an A for Affordable, Planning, Dec. 2006, at 6, 6–9; see, e.g., 
Carol J. Williams, Leaving Key West to the Wealthy, L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 2008, at A17. 
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lem in a variety of ways.3 One of the most popular and effective solutions 
has been the enactment of inclusionary zoning ordinances requiring 
residential developers to set aside a specified percentage of new units— 
often ten to fifteen percent—which must be sold or rented at prices 
deemed affordable to low- and moderate-income households.4 Another 
solution is voluntary density bonus incentives, which permit residential 
developers to build at higher densities than zoning would normally allow 
in exchange for creating a specified percentage of affordable units.5 In 
addition, local governments often team with nonprofit developers to 
create housing that is set aside for low- and moderate-income house-
holds by leveraging local, state, and federal grants through public-private 
partnerships.6 Such programs have produced tens of thousands of af-
fordable housing units.7 These units have historically been available to 
income-qualified applicants regardless of their residency or occupation.8 
 Local governments are increasingly restricting eligibility for some or 
all of their affordable housing set-asides.9 For reasons this Note will ex-
plore, many local governments now stipulate—either through explicit 
ordinances or through unpublished housing program policies—that 
preference for affordable units shall be given to applicants who currently 
reside within the government’s jurisdiction.10 Other programs grant 
preference to individuals who work within a local government’s bounda-
ries or are employed in various civic occupations, such as police officers, 
firefighters, teachers, or nurses.11 
                                                                                                                        
3 See John Emmeus Davis, Between Devolution and the Deep Blue Sea: What’s a City or State to 
Do?, in A Right to Housing 364, 364 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 2006). 
4 See Brian R. Lerman, Note, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning—The Answer to the Affordable 
Housing Problem, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 383, 385–89 (2006). 
5 See, e.g., Mark Bobrowski, Affordable Housing v. Open Space: A Proposal for Reconciliation, 
30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 487, 493–94 (2003). 
6 See, e.g., Goodno, supra note 1, at 7; Tim Sullivan, Putting the Force in Workforce Housing, 
Planning, Nov. 2004, at 26, 29. 
7 See, e.g., Calavita & Grimes, supra note 1, at 150. 
8 See Cecily T. Talbert, California’s Response to the Affordable Housing Crisis, (ALI-ABA 
Course of Study, Aug. 16–18, 2007), WL SN005 ALI-ABA 1491, 1523. 
9 See id. 
10 E.g., Dep’t of Neighborhood Dev., City of Boston, Resident Preference Policy 
in DND-Assisted Housing 1 (2003), available at http://www.cityofboston.gov/dnd/pdfs/ 
D_ResidentPreferencePolicyRev8-11-03.pdf; Bonita Brewer, Livermore Increases Affordable Unit 
Rules, Contra Costa Times, Apr. 13, 2005, at F4. 
11 E.g., Brewer, supra note 10, at F4; Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., N.Y. City, Housing 
Programs for Municipal Employees (2008), http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/apart-
ment/faqs-municipal-employees.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2009); League of Cal. Cities, 
Local Preference Plan Approved in Thousand Oaks, Focus on Hous., Dec. 2006, at 2, http:// 
www.cacities.org/resource_files/25219.dec2006.pdf. 
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 This Note examines the legal implications of a local government’s 
decision to operate its affordable housing program in a manner that 
gives preference to local residents and/or persons employed within its 
boundaries. Such preferences raise constitutional concerns regarding 
both infringement upon the fundamental right to travel and violation of 
equal protection guarantees because of racially discriminatory impacts.12 
In addition, local resident and employee preferences implicate a variety 
of state and federal statutes.13 Part I outlines the powerful modern 
trends that influence local governments to grant preferences. Part II ex-
plores the fundamental right to travel. Part III discusses discriminatory 
racial impacts under the Equal Protection Clause. Part IV investigates 
how the Federal Fair Housing Act is implicated by housing prefer-
ences.14 Part V analyzes how these legal issues affect local resident and 
employee preferences. 
I. The Rationale for Granting Preferences 
A. Local Resident Preferences 
 Local resident preferences are motivated by one of the most basic 
realities of representative democracy: an elected official’s desire to favor 
her own constituents over those to whom she is not politically account-
able.15 Elected officials simply cannot ignore the dearth of affordable 
housing in many metropolitan areas.16 In Washington, D.C., for exam-
ple, the waitlist for affordable housing currently includes over 57,000 
income-qualified families, and it takes several years before an applicant 
actually receives any form of assistance.17 Nationwide, several studies 
suggest that there is a shortage of affordable housing by at least five mil-
                                                                                                                        
12 Heather Gould, The Legal Tightrope of Local Preferences, Focus on Hous., June 2006, at 
9, available at http://www.cacities.org/resource_files/24811.june2006.pdf. 
13 This Note will focus specifically on the Federal Fair Housing Act. However, there are a 
variety of analogous state statutes that could be implicated. Many state fair housing acts in-
clude language that expressly prohibits housing decision makers from considering an appli-
cant’s lawful “source of income.” See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 12955(a) (West 2008); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-64c(a)(1) (West 2008); D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1402.21(a) (LexisNexis 
2008); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.421(1) (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-5(1) (2000); Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 106.50(nm) (West 2007). These statutes ostensibly forbid any type of local 
employee or civic occupational preference. 
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2000). 
15 See James J. Hartnett, Note, Affordable Housing, Exclusionary Zoning, and American 
Apartheid: Using Title VIII to Foster Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 89, 133 (1993). 
16 See Talbert, supra note 8, at 1495–96. 
17 Yolanda Woodlee, Agency Is Updating Housing Aid Wait List, Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 2008, 
at B04. 
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lion units.18 Given such a disheartening scenario, it is not surprising that 
locally elected representatives now seek to favor their own constituents 
over nonvoting outsiders.19 
 There is a perceived problem that desirable communities attract a 
disproportionate share of nonresident applicants, thereby unfairly bur-
dening low-income applicants who reside in desirable areas because they 
have to compete for a limited number of affordable housing units against 
a limitless horde of nonresidents.20 For instance, in Santa Monica, Cali-
fornia, a local newspaper article decried the city’s lack of preference for 
current residents because the affordable housing waitlist was inundated 
by nonresident applicants.21 The City of Santa Monica had recently con-
tributed $2.3 million toward an affordable housing development for 
elderly persons.22 Of the sixty-five affordable units created, only twelve 
went to previous Santa Monica residents.23 Affordable housing units in 
desirable communities clearly act as magnets, attracting disproportion-
ately large numbers of outsiders.24 Likely for this reason, the majority of 
local resident preferences have been implemented by desirable commu-
nities, where the perceived ills of being an affordable housing magnet 
are felt most keenly.25 
 Finally, local governments have an interest in preserving their citi-
zens’ residency because continued ties to a community can foster a more 
stable and involved community over time.26 Long-term local residents 
                                                                                                                        
18 Dillon, supra note 2, at 6. 
19 See Hartnett, supra note 15, at 133. 
20 See, e.g., Teresa Rochester & Jorge Casuso, Against the Odds: Chances for New Housing Slim 
for Santa Monica Seniors, Lookout News (Santa Monica, Cal.), May 12, 2002, available at 
http://www.surfsantamonica.com/ssm_site/the_lookout/news/News-2002/May-2002/05_13_ 
02_Chances_for_New_Housing_Slim_for_SM_Seniors.htm. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See, e.g., id. 
25 See, e.g., Cranston, R.I., Mun. Code § 8.48.010(c) (2006); Marin County, Cal., 
Code § 22.22.040(D) (2008); Novato, Cal., Mun. Code § 19.24.050(C) (2006); Quincy, 
Mass., Mun. Code § 17.04.235(D) (2006); Santa Rosa, Cal., Mun. Code § 21-02.050(D) 
(2006); Dep’t of Neighborhood Dev., City of Boston, supra note 10, at 1; Telluride, 
Colo., Hous. Auth., Employee Qualification and Waiting List Policy (2003), available 
at http://www.smrha.org/EmpQuali.pdf; Provincetown, Mass., Local Preference for 
Affordable Housing (2003), available at http://www.provincetowngov.org/affordable/ 
AffHsgPreference.htm. 
26 See Patrick C. Jobes, Residential Stability and Crime in Small Rural Agricultural and Recrea-
tional Towns, 42 Soc. Persp. 499, 500, 508 (1999); Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and 
Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Science 918, 918 (1997); Robert J. 
Sampson, Linking the Micro- and Macrolevel Dimensions of Community Social Organization, 70 
Soc. Forces 43, 45 (1991). 
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are arguably more likely to invest in a community’s continued prosperity 
and livability than are transitory residents.27 Some studies suggest that 
long-term residents take better care of their property, commit less crime, 
and demonstrate higher levels of civic involvement than do transitory 
residents.28 
B. Local Employee Preferences 
 Local employee preferences are supported by a range of urban 
planning, environmental justice, and even public safety principles.29 
Planners have long extolled the virtues of having “jobs-housing balance” 
in a community.30 Indeed, one of the tenets of “smart growth” develop-
ment is locating people near their places of employment.31 However, 
residents of many communities not only have to contend with swelling 
traffic congestion and commute times, but also find it increasingly diffi-
cult to obtain affordable housing close to their places of employment.32 
A balance between housing and jobs in a city confers many benefits, “in-
cluding reduced driving and congestion, fewer air emissions, lower costs 
to businesses and commuters, lower public expenditures on facilities and 
services, greater family stability, and higher quality of life.”33 
 It is not just urban planners that advocate jobs-housing balance; the 
private sector is also a strong supporter. A recent survey of large employ-
ers reported that the affordable housing shortage has been problematic 
for the hiring and retention of entry- and mid-level workers.34 The sur-
vey also reported that entry- and mid-level workers expressed keen inter-
est in moving closer to work if affordable housing were to be made avail-
able.35 Even middle-class jobs no longer guarantee that an employees 
                                                                                                                        
27 See Sampson et al., supra note 26, at 919. 
28 See id. 
29 See Susan Handy, The Road Less Driven, 72 J. Am. Plan. Ass’n 274, 274–76 (2006). 
30 See Jonathan Levine, Rethinking Accessibility and Jobs-Housing Balance, 64 J. Am. Plan. 
Ass’n 133, 133–40 (1998). 
31 See Jerry Weitz, Jobs-Housing Balance 9 (2003). 
32 Michael Armstrong & Brett Sears, S. Cal. Ass’n of Gov’ts, The New Economy 
and Jobs/Housing Balance in Southern California 11 (2001), available at http://www. 
scag.ca.gov/Housing/pdfs/balance.pdf; see also Robert Cervero & Michael Duncan, Which 
Reduces Vehicle Travel More: Jobs-Housing Balance or Retail-Housing Mixing?, 72 J. Am. Plan. 
Ass’n 475, 475 (2006); Handy, supra note 29, at 276. 
33 Armstrong & Sears, supra note 32, at 7; see also Handy, supra note 29, at 276. 
34 Urban Land Inst., Lack of Affordable Housing Near Jobs: A Problem for Em-
ployers and Employees—New Survey from ULI Looks at Impact of Commuting (2007), 
available at http://www.uli.org/sitecore/content/ULI2Home/News/MediaCenter/PressRe-
leases/2007%20archives.aspx (follow hyperlink to title). 
35 Id. 
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will be able to find affordable housing reasonably close to work.36 Econo-
mists note that the shared public and private need for workforce hous-
ing was “born of the economic boom of the 1990s,” during which time 
“salaries for the top American earners increased dramatically,” while the 
bottom sixty percent barely kept pace with inflation and home prices 
doubled.37 
 The burdens of traffic congestion and long commute times do not 
fall equally on all members of society.38 Research indicates that both 
commute times and distances for low-income and minority workers tend 
to be significantly longer than for other workers.39 This trend particu-
larly impacts low-wage service workers in desirable communities.40 Jani-
torial staff, restaurant workers, and grocery clerks are just a few of the 
many service workers who are greatly needed to accommodate higher 
income clientele.41 However, the lack of affordable housing in desirable 
communities forces service workers to live in distant locations that are 
more affordable.42 “After housing, transportation is now the second 
[largest] expense for America’s families.”43 In addition, the need to own 
multiple automobiles “is placing homeownership out of reach for many 
low-income families.”44 
 Preferences for vital civic employees also have strong justifications.45 
There are many benefits to having persons employed in certain critical 
occupations—such as police officers, firefighters, paramedics, and 
nurses—reside in the locality for which they work.46 Their continued 
presence provides models of public service to their neighborhoods, and 
                                                                                                                        
36 See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 26–27. 
37 Id. at 26. 
38 See Qing Shen, Spatial and Social Dimensions of Commuting, 66 J. Am. Plan. Ass’n 68, 68 
(2000). 
39 See id. 
40 See Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harv. Univ., The State of the Nation’s 
Housing 26–27 (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son 
2007/son2007.pdf. 
41 See Williams, supra note 2, at A17. 
42 See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 27. 
43 Anne Canby, Fannie Mae Found., Affordable Housing and Transportation: 
Creating New Linkages Benefiting Low-Income Families 1 (2003). 
44 Id. 
45 See, e.g., HUD Good Neighbor Next Door Program, http://www.hud.gov/offices/ 
hsg/sfh/reo/goodn/gnndabot.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). For instance, the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, as well as many state housing finance authori-
ties, grant preferences for teachers, firefighters, EMTs, police officers, etc. Id. 
46 See, e.g., Christopher Thale, Assigned to Patrol: Neighborhoods, Police, and Changing De-
ployment Practices in New York City Before 1930, 37 J. of Soc. Hist. 1037, 1039 (2004); Gary 
Polakovic, Housing Perks on the Rise for Middle Class, L.A. Times, Apr. 3, 2006, at B1. 
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they can more readily respond to emergencies than if they had to com-
mute from distant locations and risk delays due to traffic congestion.47 
Local governments across the nation are experiencing great difficulty in 
filling vital civic positions, due largely to the lack of affordable housing.48 
Some local governments have become so desperate that they provide, at 
considerable expense, low-interest loans and other fiscal inducements to 
vital civic employees in exchange for their commitment to reside within 
the jurisdiction.49 
 Recent downturns in real estate markets are not alleviating the 
affordable housing crisis for the people who need it the most.50 It is a 
sad irony that, despite stagnating and falling home prices, affordable 
housing is not becoming more available.51 In fact, the downturn, which 
has largely been caused by predatory lending practices to minority and 
low-income populations, has resulted in skyrocketing default and fore-
closure rates in many working-class and low-income neighborhoods.52 
Presently, nearly one-quarter of subprime mortgages are in default.53 
II. Right to Travel & Interstate Migration 
 Local resident and employee preferences have been frequently 
challenged, and occasionally invalidated, for violating constitutional 
principles.54 Though not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental right to 
travel and interstate migration.55 Specifically, the Court has interpreted 
                                                                                                                        
47 See Thale, supra note 46; Polakovic, supra note 46. Courts have recognized a compel-
ling governmental interest in cases involving municipal requirements that police and fire-
fighters reside within city limits. See Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 501 (D.N.J. 1972). 
48 See Chris Fiscelli, Reason Found., New Approaches to Affordable Housing: 
Overview of the Housing Affordability Problem 2 (2005); Vaishali Honawar, School 
Districts Devising New Ways to Offer Teachers Affordable Housing, Educ. Week, Aug. 9, 2006, at 1. 
49 See Walter Olesky, A Cop Next Door, Pol’y Rev., Mar.–Apr. 1996, at 8; Resident Officer 
Program of Elgin, http://www.cityofelgin.org/index.asp?NID=291 (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
50 See Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harv. Univ., supra note 40, at 3. 
51 See id. 
52 See Peter S. Goodman & Vikas Bajaj, In the Land of Many Ifs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2008, at 
C1; Dean Baker, The Housing Crash Recession: How Did We Get Here?, Now on PBS, Mar. 21, 
2008, http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/412/housing-recession.html. 
53 Goodman & Bajaj, supra note 52, at C1, C6. 
54 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and policies 864–68 
(3d ed. 2006). 
55 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 489–90 (1999) (invalidating a state law that lim-
ited new residents’ welfare benefits to the level of the state from which the person moved); 
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 746, 757 (1966) (stating that the right to travel and 
migrate “occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union”); Crandall 
v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 36 (1867) (invalidating a state tax on railroads for the trans-
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the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV to protect individu-
als from unreasonable restrictions on basic rights—including conduct-
ing commercial activity and exercising constitutionally protected liber-
ties—when traveling to state or local jurisdictions in which they do not 
reside.56 In addition, the Court has most recently interpreted the Four-
teenth Amendment to protect the right of individuals to establish resi-
dency wherever they choose without being treated differently than 
longer-tenured residents.57 
The manner in which a law burdens the fundamental right to 
travel and migration ultimately determines the level of judicial scrutiny 
that law will receive.58 Courts draw an important distinction between 
                                                                                                                        
portation of people out of state); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (invali-
dating a state law imposing a tax on aliens arriving from foreign ports). 
There is some dispute about whether the Federal Constitution protects an individual’s 
right to intrastate travel. Compare Wardwell v. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 625 (6th Cir. 1976) 
(holding that a right to intrastate travel is not protected by the Federal Constitution) with 
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Federal 
Constitution protects the right to intrastate travel through public spaces and roadways). See 
generally Andrew C. Porter, Comment, Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate 
Travel, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 820 (1992) (discussing the right to intrastate travel). Though the 
Supreme Court has declined to decide the issue, many lower courts have held that intrastate 
travel is a logical extension of the right of interstate travel, and thus merits the same degree 
of constitutional protection. See, e.g., King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 
648–49 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971); Hawk v. Fenner, 396 F. Supp. 1, 4 
(D.S.D. 1975); Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143, 147 (D. Del. 1972), aff’d, 485 F.2d 
1151 (3d Cir. 1973). In King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated a five-year durational residency requirement for 
admission to public housing. 442 F.2d at 649. The Housing Authority argued that there was 
no fundamental right to intrastate travel for the plaintiffs, who had moved from one city in 
New York State to another. Id. at 648–49. However, the court disagreed, concluding that “[i]t 
would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental pre-
cept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel 
within a state.” Id. at 648. 
A small minority of lower court decisions reject the existence of a right to intrastate 
travel. See Wardwell, 529 F.2d at 625; Ector v. City of Torrance, 514 P.2d 433, 436–37 (Cal. 
1973). However, these cases are distinguishable from local resident and employee prefer-
ences because they involve requirements for municipal employees to be residents of the city 
for which they work. See Wardwell, 529 F.2d at 626; Ector, 514 P.2d at 433. Additionally, a 
plaintiff who was not a resident of the state in which he was challenging a local affordable 
housing preference would be able to invoke interstate travel protections and potentially 
overturn the policy. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 619 (1969). The existence of a 
federally protected right to intrastate travel therefore appears of little consequence for the 
purposes of this Note. 
56 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2; Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 274 (1985) (invalidat-
ing New Hampshire law requiring residence in state prior to being admitted to the bar). 
57 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 490, 502–03. 
58 See Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 n.3 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality 
opinion). 
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laws that grant preferences to residents based upon the length of their 
residency—durational residency requirements—and laws that merely 
grant preferences to residents over nonresidents—bona fide residency 
requirements.59 Durational residency requirements generally receive 
strict judicial scrutiny, and therefore will be upheld only upon a show-
ing of a compelling governmental purpose.60 Bona fide residency re-
quirements, however, are treated with more deference and are upheld 
if they are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.61 
A. Durational Residency Requirements 
 Some durational residency requirements stipulate that before re-
ceiving a certain public benefit a resident must have lived in the juris-
diction for a particular length of time.62 Previously litigated examples 
include waiting periods for welfare benefits, voting, divorces, in-state 
tuition rates, and state-funded nonemergency hospital services.63 As 
will be discussed below, courts often apply strict scrutiny to these dur-
ational residency requirements because they risk deterring interstate 
travel and migration.64 
 In Shapiro v. Thompson, the leading case invalidating a durational 
residency requirement, the Supreme Court held a one-year residency 
requirement for receipt of welfare payments unconstitutional.65 Follow-
ing strict equal protection scrutiny, the Court determined that govern-
mental discrimination between newer and longer-tenured residents im-
posed an unjustified “penalt[y]” on the rights of those who had recently 
migrated to the state.66 The Court reasoned that the law discouraged 
people from moving to the state because “[a]n indigent . . . will doubt-
                                                                                                                        
59 See id. 
60 See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 250 (1974). 
61 See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 n.7 (1983). 
62 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 395 (1975). 
63 See id. (upholding law that required one year of residence for citizens to be eligible to 
divorce); Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 250 (invalidating law that required one year of residency 
in the county prior to receipt of non-emergency medical services at the county’s expense); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972) (invalidating law that required one year of 
residency to establish voter eligibility); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 618 (1969) (in-
validating law that required one year of residency in the state prior to receipt of welfare 
payments); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff’d mem., 401 U.S. 
985 (1971) (upholding law that required new residents to pay higher tuition rates during 
their first year of residency). 
64 See Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 898 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality opin-
ion). 
65 394 U.S. at 618. 
66 Id. at 638 n.21. 
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less hesitate [to move] if he knows that he must risk making the move 
without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance during 
his first year of residence, when his need may be most acute.”67 Because 
the law deterred migration, it was found to be a “penalt[y]” on nonresi-
dents’ right to travel and migration.68 The government was unable to 
provide a compelling purpose for the durational residency requirement; 
budgetary planning and the encouragement of new residents to enter 
the workforce were found to be insufficient purposes.69 
 The Supreme Court affirmed Shapiro five years later in Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County.70 In that case, the Court applied strict scru-
tiny to a law that denied government-funded nonemergency hospital 
services to persons who had not resided in the state for at least one 
year.71 Relying more on the basic necessity of medical services than the 
deterrent effect of the law, the Court held that the law “penalize[d]” mi-
gration.72 The Court found the county’s justification for the law— pre-
serving fiscal integrity—insufficient to excuse the penalty it placed on 
newly arrived residents.73 
 Determining whether strict scrutiny is the appropriate form of 
analysis ultimately turns on whether the durational residency require-
ment “penalizes” the exercise of the right to travel and migration.74 
This penalty inquiry is derived from a footnote in Shapiro in which the 
Court limited the scope of its holding: 
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence 
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tui-
tion-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, 
to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote 
compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, 
may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of in-
terstate travel.75 
In Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, a four-vote plurality led by Justice Bren-
nan appeared to adopt this view when it affirmed that a law “implicates 
the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding 
                                                                                                                        
67 Id. at 629. 
68 Id. at 638 n.21. 
69 Id. at 634, 638. 
70 415 U.S. 250, 250 (1974). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 263–64. 
74 See Westenfelder v. Ferguson, 998 F. Supp. 146, 151 (D.R.I. 1998). 
75 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1968) (emphasis added). 
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travel is its primary objective, or when it uses any classification which 
serves to penalize the exercise of that right.”76 However, the Soto-Lopez 
test has never been accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court, mak-
ing its precedential significance unclear.77 Furthermore, the Court has 
not explained precisely what constitutes a “penalty” on the right to 
travel.78 Apart from stating that “not all durational residency require-
ments are penalties,” the Court has provided little guidance.79 
 The only durational residency requirements the Supreme Court has 
reviewed that have not “penalized” the right to travel, and thus received 
deferential rational basis review, have been limited to the contexts of di-
vorce and in-state tuition benefits.80 Unlike welfare and free medical aid, 
the Court inferred that divorce and in-state tuition benefits are not of 
                                                                                                                        
76 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (citations and quotation 
omitted). 
77 Westenfelder, 998 F. Supp. at 151 n.7. 
78 See Mem’l Hosp. 415 U.S. at 256–57; Westenfelder, 998 F. Supp. at 152. 
79 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 418–19 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Mem’l Hosp., 
415 U.S. at 256–59. 
80 Sosna, 419 U.S. at 393; Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 234 (D. Minn. 1970), 
aff’d mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971). The Court upheld a durational residency requirement for 
divorce in Sosna, 419 U.S. at 393–94. The law in question, which prevented newly arrived 
residents from obtaining a divorce during their first year of residency, was upheld in part 
because it was “of a different stripe.” Id. at 406. In his dissent, Justice Marshall inferred that, 
unlike welfare benefits, free medical aid, and voting, divorce was not of such fundamental 
importance that it would be unconstitutional for the State to “condition its receipt upon 
long-term residence.” See id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It was doubtful that a waiting 
period for divorce would actually deter any migration. See id. at 406. Thus, Justice Marshall’s 
dissent implied that the durational residency requirement did not penalize the right to 
travel. Id. at 418–19 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
The Court summarily upheld a lower court decision that employed similar analysis to 
Sosna in allowing a durational residency requirement for in-state tuition benefits. Starns, 326 
F. Supp. at 234. In Starns, the court found the state law to be distinguishable from Shapiro in 
two important respects. Id. at 237. First, the law did not have the specific objective of penal-
izing migration or travel. Id. Second, the law did not deter interstate movement by denying 
basic necessities to needy residents. Id. at 238. As with waiting periods for divorce, it is 
unlikely that a person would hesitate to migrate due to eligibility requirements for in-state 
tuition. Id. at 237–38. Thus, the court implicitly found that a waiting period for in-state tui-
tion benefits did not penalize the right to travel. See id. 
In the unique context of voting, the Court has both invalidated and upheld durational 
residency requirements. For instance, in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court overturned a state law 
requiring one year of residence in the state, or three months of residence in the county, 
prior to gaining eligibility to vote. 405 U.S. 330, 330 (1972). However, in Marston v. Lewis, it 
upheld a fifty day requirement. 410 U.S. 679, 681–82 (1973). In both cases, the Court noted 
that “fixing a constitutionally acceptable [waiting] period is surely a matter of degree.” Mar-
ston, 410 U.S. at 681; see Dunn, 405 U.S. at 348. The Court had to balance the state’s compel-
ling interest in preventing voter fraud against the risk that too long of a waiting period 
would penalize migration. See Marston, 410 U.S. at 680. Ostensibly, it decided that 50 days 
was an appropriate threshold. See id. at 679. 
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such fundamental importance that it would be unconstitutional for the 
State to “condition [their] receipt upon long-term residence.”81 Because 
the divorce and in-state tuition residency requirements did not deny ba-
sic necessities to needy residents, the Court surmised that they were 
unlikely to actually deter any migration.82 Thus, the Court implicitly 
found that a waiting period for these public benefits did not penalize the 
right to travel and migration.83 
 In addition to invaliding durational residency requirements that 
completely deny benefits to newly arrived residents, the Court has also 
invalidated laws that provide less public benefits to new arrivals.84 For 
example, in Zobel v. Williams, the Court invalidated an Alaska law that 
distributed state oil revenues through a formula that preferred older 
residents to newer ones.85 The Court found Alaska’s goal of rewarding 
older residents for their past contributions insufficient to justify its pen-
alty on the right to travel and migration.86 
 Two other cases are especially helpful in understanding that courts 
will protect an individual’s right to travel and migration even when 
durational residency requirements do not completely deny benefits to 
newly arrived residents. In Soto-Lopez, the Supreme Court overturned a 
New York law that gave hiring preference to veterans who were resi-
dents of the state when they entered the military; the law gave no pref-
erence to veterans who resided in other states immediately prior to 
their military service.87 Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan stated: 
Once veterans establish bona fide residenc[y] . . . they . . .  
“may not be discriminated against solely on the basis of the 
date of their arrival in the State.” For as long as New York 
chooses to offer its resident veterans a civil service employment 
preference, the Constitution requires that it do so without re-
gard to residence at the time of entry into the services.88 
In Saenz v. Roe, the Court invalidated a law that limited for one year the 
welfare benefits of new residents to the level of the state from which they 
                                                                                                                        
81 See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 237–38. 
82 See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 238. 
83 See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406; Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 238. 
84 Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 864–66. 
85 457 U.S. 55, 55 (1982). 
86 See id. at 65. Similarly, in Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, the Court held that a state 
law providing property tax exemptions to Vietnam veterans who had become residents of 
the state prior to a certain date failed simple rational basis review. 472 U.S. 612, 612 (1985). 
87 Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 898 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
88 Id. at 911–12 (quoting Hooper, 472 U.S. at 613). 
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had moved.89 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens made it clear that 
the Court was not persuaded by arguments that the law only partially 
denied welfare benefits to new residents.90 The fact that the law penal-
ized their right to travel less than an outright denial of welfare benefits 
was not dispositive.91 Rather, because “the right to travel embraces the 
citizen’s right to be treated equally in her new State of residence, the 
discriminatory classification is itself a penalty.”92 
 Following Shapiro, courts apply strict scrutiny to laws that penalize 
interstate travel and migration.93 Because courts often determine whether 
a law imposes a penalty based on the likelihood that the law will discour-
age residents from migrating to a jurisdiction, courts are likely to find a 
penalty when the law restricts basic necessities, such as welfare and 
medical care, from newly arrived residents.94 However, the Supreme 
Court has also recognized penalties in laws that only partially deny non-
essential benefits to new residents despite such laws’ seemingly de-
creased likelihood of deterring travel and migration.95 
B. Bona Fide Residency Requirements 
 Courts show much more deference to bona fide residency re-
quirements than durational residency requirements.96 Whereas dur-
ational residency requirements “treat established residents differently 
based on the time they migrated into the State,” bona fide residency 
requirements simply provide residents with a public benefit that is not 
available to nonresidents.97 Under a bona fide residency requirement, 
all current residents are eligible for the public benefit and no distinc-
tions are made based on length of residency.98 Such laws are not gen-
erally viewed as penalizing the right to travel and migration.99 
                                                                                                                        
89 526 U.S. 489, 489 (1999). 
90 Id. at 504–05. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 505. The Court was also unpersuaded by a federal law that expressly allowed 
states to distinguish welfare benefits between new residents and longer-tenured residents. Id. 
at 508. Congress cannot empower states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
93 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969). 
94 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 418–19 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Starns v. 
Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 237–38 (D. Minn. 1970). 
95 See Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 234. 
96 See Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 n.3 (1986). 
97 See id. 
98 See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328–29 (1983). 
99 See id. 
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 The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld bona fide residency 
requirements.100 In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, the 
Court used simple rational basis review when it found constitutional a 
requirement that municipal employees must reside within city limits as 
a condition of employment.101 Likewise, in Martinez v. Bynum, the 
Court upheld a law that denied free public education to nonresident 
children who lived apart from their parents and were in the school dis-
trict solely to attend school.102 The majority in both cases stated that a 
government can constitutionally restrict eligibility for a public benefit 
to its bona fide residents.103 In fact, the Martinez court explained that 
governments have a “substantial . . . interest in assuring that services 
provided for its residents are enjoyed only by residents.”104 Unlike dur-
ational residency requirements that risk penalizing interstate travel and 
migration, bona fide residency requirements do “not burden or penal-
ize the constitutional right of interstate travel, for any person is free to 
move to a [governmental jurisdiction] and to establish residence 
there.”105 
 Bona fide resident and employee preferences in affordable housing 
have been upheld as not violative of the right to travel and migration.106 
In Fayerweather v. Town of Narragansett Housing Authority, the U.S. District 
Court of Rhode Island reviewed a policy that gave preference to both 
local residents and local employees in the allocation of Section 8 hous-
ing vouchers.107 Citing to McCarthy and Martinez, the court reviewed the 
                                                                                                                        
100 E.g., id. at 331. Bona fide residency requirements risk being invalidated when they 
employ irrebuttable presumptions—governmental classifications which are made without 
determining the individual merits of a person’s residency. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 
441, 441 (1973). For instance, in Vlandis v. Kline, the Supreme Court overturned a state law 
requiring students who were not residents when applying for college admission to pay non-
resident tuition throughout their education. Id. Residents of the state who had established 
residency after applying for college were barred from receiving in-state tuition benefits, 
while residents who had been in the state since the time of their application received such 
benefits. Id. In Vlandis, the Court pointed to its Starns decision, in which it upheld a dur-
ational residency requirement allowing students to be eligible for in-state tuition benefits 
after one year of residency. Id. at 452–53 n.9 (citing Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 234). Because the 
law in Starns did not perpetually classify students as non-residents, as the law in Vlandis did, 
it did not offend the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. Id. at 452–53 n.9. 
101 424 U.S. 645, 646–47 (1976). 
102 461 U.S. at 321. 
103 Id. at 328; McCarthy, 424 U.S. at 647. 
104 461 U.S. at 328. 
105 Id. at 328–29. 
106 Fayerweather v. Town of Narragansett Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 19, 19 (D.R.I. 1994). 
107 Id. at 20, 22 n.3. 
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preferences under rational basis review.108 The court concluded that the 
government had a legitimate interest in providing housing for its own 
residents and employees before aiding residents and employees of other 
communities; it implied that the preferences did not penalize travel and 
migration under Shapiro.109 
III. Equal Protection Clause: Facially Neutral Laws with 
Racially Discriminatory Impacts 
 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antees that no person or class of persons will be denied the same protec-
tions of the law that are enjoyed by other persons or classes in similar 
circumstances.110 Though challenges to governmental classifications 
based on equal protection grounds are generally treated with deferential 
rational basis review, governmental classifications that affect suspect 
classes or infringe upon fundamental rights are subjected to heightened 
judicial scrutiny.111 For instance, a classification that is drawn based on 
race—a suspect class—or a classification that burdens migration—a fun-
damental right—will be invalidated unless it is necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental purpose.112 However, nonresidents and non-
employees have never been recognized as suspect classes.113 Likewise, 
courts have never recognized a fundamental right to affordable hous-
ing.114 Thus, the Equal Protection Clause appears to be an inappropriate 
vehicle to overturn the facial classifications used for affordable housing 
allocation.115 
                                                                                                                        
108 Id. at 22. 
109 See Id. at 22. In another case that cited Fayerweather, the court found that a bona fide 
residency requirement for a homeless shelter did not violate the right to travel or migration. 
Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, No. 07 CV 0217, 2007 WL 2790752, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
24, 2007). 
110 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
111 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985). Race, 
alienage, and national origin are generally held to be suspect classes. Id. at 440. The Court 
has recognized an individual’s fundamental right to travel, privacy, marriage, and procrea-
tion, though these rights are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. See generally 
Chemerinsky, supra note 54, ch. 10 (describing fundamental rights under the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses). 
112 See Ken Zimmerman & Arielle Cohen, Exclusionary Zoning: Constitutional and Federal 
Statutory Responses, in The Legal Guide to Affordable Housing Development 39, 45 
(Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2005). 
113 See Chemerinsky, supra note 54, ch. 10 (describing fundamental rights under due 
process and equal protection). 
114 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73–74 (1972). 
115 See id. 
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 Though the Equal Protection Clause probably cannot facially in-
validate local resident and employee classifications, the discriminatory 
effects of such policies could theoretically sustain an as applied challenge 
under the Equal Protection Clause.116 Many laws that do not overtly 
mention race are nonetheless implemented in a manner that either dis-
criminates against minorities or has a disproportionate impact upon 
them.117 However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that dis-
criminatory racial impacts alone are insufficient to sustain an equal pro-
tection claim; there must also be proof of purposeful discrimination.118 
 Proving the existence of purposeful discrimination has been an 
exceedingly difficult undertaking for plaintiffs.119 Only the most brazen 
of legislators would state bigoted purposes for their policies.120 In addi-
tion, benevolent motives can be espoused for most laws.121 “Not only 
might it be impossible for a court to determine the motivation behind 
the choices of a group of legislators, but, even if a court could do so, 
the legislature could presumably lawfully reenact the challenged policy 
by passing it for different reasons.”122 Thus, the intrinsic difficulties of 
proving intent can persuade courts to uphold laws despite actual dis-
criminatory intent and impacts.123 
 The Supreme Court articulated three ways through which purpose-
ful discrimination can be proved in its landmark decision Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp (Arlington Heights I ).124 
First, a law’s impact may be so plainly discriminatory that no nondis-
criminatory justification would be possible.125 Second, the context and 
                                                                                                                        
116 See Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 710. 
117 Id. 
118 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 279–80 (1987) (upholding death penalty conviction despite evidence of statisti-
cally disproportionate capital punishment convictions due to lack of discriminatory purpose 
in plaintiff’s immediate case). 
119 Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 712. When proving purposeful discrimination, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the government acted from a desire to discriminate; legisla-
tors’ mere knowledge that a policy will have discriminatory consequences is not enough. 
Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (explaining that purposeful discrimination 
implies that the government “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in 
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”). 
120 See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1108 
(1989). 
121 See id. 
122 Id. 
123 Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 712. 
124 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977)[Arlington Heights I]. 
125 Id. at 266. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the plaintiff challenged a city ordinance requiring 
that laundries be located in brick or stone buildings unless a waiver was obtained. 118 U.S. 
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sequence of events leading up to the challenged policy can indicate pur-
poseful discrimination.126 Third, the legislative and/or administrative 
history of a law can reveal explicit discriminatory purposes.127 Absent pur-
poseful discrimination that can be proved by inexplicably dispropor-
tionate effects, obvious contextual circumstances, or barefaced state-
ments, however, the Equal Protection Clause is not suited to overturn a 
facially neutral law merely because it has discriminatory impacts.128 
 Though discriminatory racial impacts alone are insufficient to estab-
lish an equal protection claim, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment empowered Congress to legislate against discrimination.129 It is 
through such legislation that Congress has enacted a wide range of civil 
rights laws—including Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1982 
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing 
                                                                                                                        
356, 356 (1886). Upon producing evidence that over 200 waiver applications were denied to 
persons of Chinese ancestry whereas all waiver applications filed by non-Chinese persons 
were approved, the plaintiff convinced the Court of the city’s discriminatory intent. See id. at 
359. Similarly, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the plaintiff challenged a government’s redrawing of 
municipal boundaries that excluded virtually all of the city’s black voters while excluding 
not a single white voter. 364 U.S. 339, 339 (1960). The Court was once again persuaded that 
legislators had acted for no other purpose than racial discrimination. Id. Statistical evidence, 
therefore, can be a powerful tool in demonstrating discriminatory intent. See Chemerinsky, 
supra note 54, at 716. However, cases such as Yick Wo and Gomillion are quite rare. Arlington 
Heights I, 429 U.S. at 266 (“Absent a [statistical] pattern [this] stark . . . impact alone is not 
determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.”). 
126 Arlington Heights I, 429 U.S. at 267. For example, in Guinn v. United States, the Court 
invalidated a state law requiring a literacy test for voting that effectively exempted white 
citizens through a grandfather clause for descendants of those who where eligible to vote in 
1866. 238 U.S. 347, 347–48 (1915). Though the law was facially neutral, its historical context 
made the legislature’s discriminatory purpose perfectly clear. See id. at 357–58. The Court in 
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County invalidated a policy that closed public 
schools in response to desegregation orders, effectively forcing residents to pay for children 
to attend segregated private schools. 377 U.S. 218, 219 (1964). The facially neutral law’s 
discriminatory purpose was once again ascertained by looking at its historical context. See id. 
at 220–25. 
127 Arlington Heights I, 429 U.S. at 268. By examining statements made by lawmakers in 
the transcripts of their meetings or reports, courts are able to ascertain publicly stated moti-
vations. See id. However, the real-world usefulness of this method is most limited because it 
would take an unusually shameless legislator to openly state a racially discriminatory motive. 
See Ortiz, supra note 120, at 1108. 
128 Arlington Heights I, 429 U.S. at 266–68. Even if a plaintiff is able to prove the existence 
of purposeful discrimination through one of the three methods mentioned in Arlington 
Heights I, the law is not immediately invalidated. Id. at 270 n.21. Rather, the burden would 
then shift to the government to prove that it would have taken the same action even if it did 
not have discriminatory motivation. Id. Thus, the government is given an opportunity to 
articulate a non-discriminatory rationale for its law. Id. This burden shifting poses yet an-
other obstacle for potential plaintiffs in a judicial system that appears extremely hesitant to 
overturn facially neutral laws for violating the Equal Protection Clause. See id. 
129 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. 
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Act—which do allow statutory violations to be proved by discriminatory 
impact apart from discriminatory intent.130 Thus, a plaintiff who is fore-
closed from bringing suit under the Equal Protection Clause for failing to 
establish purposeful discrimination may still be able to bring suit under a 
civil rights statute.131 
IV. The Fair Housing Act 
A. Overview of the Fair Housing Act 
 The Fair Housing Act (FHA), which was enacted as Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, has been successfully used by plaintiffs seeking 
to invalidate policies or practices shown to have a discriminatory impact 
on the basis of race—or another criterion barred by the FHA—without 
evidence of purposeful discrimination.132 The FHA prohibits the refusal 
to rent or sell, or to “otherwise make unavailable or deny,” a dwelling to 
any person “because of” race, religion, sex, familial status, national ori-
gin, or disability.133 In addition to protecting against specific discrimina-
tory actions—such as inequitable advertising practices—the FHA also 
features relaxed standing requirements for plaintiffs.134 
                                                                                                                        
130 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); Fair 
Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2000); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000)); 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 424 (1971); Ortiz, supra note 120, at 1111. 
131 See Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 711–12. 
132 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631; see Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 
F.2d 926, 934 (2nd Cir. 1988) (holding that evidence of discriminatory effect establishes 
prima facie case, at least for public defendants); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 
1032, 1038 (2nd Cir. 1979) (holding that discriminatory effect establishes prima facie case 
under FHA); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Betsey 
v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. City of Black Jack, 
508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 1974); Schmidt v. Boston Hous. Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988, 
994 (D. Mass. 1981); Stingley v. City of Lincoln Park, 429 F. Supp. 1379, 1385 (E.D. Mich. 
1977). 
133 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (c). It is important to note that Congress only intended the 
FHA to protect the classes that it specifically enumerated in the text. See Zimmerman & 
Cohen, supra note 112, at 53–54. Indigent individuals were not mentioned as such a group. 
See id. Thus, FHA litigation attacking local land use and zoning decisions has had to demon-
strate disproportionate impacts on one of the classes protected by the FHA. See id. 
134 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(c), 3610(a), 3612; Ronald S. Javor & Michael Allen, Federal, State, 
and Local Building and Housing Codes Affecting Affordable Housing, in The Legal Guide to 
Affordable Housing Development 162, 197 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 
2005). The text of the FHA states that an “aggrieved person” may initiate an action in order 
to attain relief from a discriminatory housing practice. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i). Con-
gress defined “aggrieved person” to include anyone who “(1) claims to have been injured by 
a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a dis-
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B. The Fair Housing Act as a Litigation Tool 
 The FHA picks up where courts are reluctant to extend equal pro-
tection guarantees because plaintiffs are able to base their challenges 
solely on a policy’s discriminatory impacts.135 After concluding that 
equal protection claims require evidence of purposeful discrimination, 
the Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corp. (Arlington Heights I ) remanded the case to a federal court of ap-
peals for a finding of FHA violations.136 Other courts have interpreted 
this decision to imply that discriminatory impacts alone are sufficient for 
FHA claims.137 In Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit explained that although the FHA’s “because 
of race” language might seem to suggest that a plaintiff must show some 
measure of purposeful discrimination, such a statutory interpretation 
would raise the plaintiff’s burden to the nearly impossible level of equal 
protection analysis.138 The Rizzo court also noted that, on remand, the 
court in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington 
Heights (Arlington Heights II ) found the “because of race” language not to 
be unique to Section 3604(a) of the FHA; the same language appears in 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows a prima facie case 
to be made by discriminatory effects alone.139 
 The legislative history of the FHA also suggests that Congress in-
tended for discriminatory impacts to suffice in an FHA claim apart 
from purposeful discrimination.140 The Rizzo court noted that during 
the Senate floor debate prior to passage of the FHA, several Congress-
men spoke of the FHA’s importance in eliminating the adverse dis-
criminatory effects of past and present prejudice in housing.141 In addi-
tion, Senator Baker introduced a doomed amendment that would have 
required proof of discriminatory intent akin to the equal protection 
                                                                                                                        
criminatory housing practice that is about to occur.” Id. § 3602(i). This broad definition 
ostensibly overrides the traditional prudential limitations on standing, which prevent plain-
tiffs from resting their claims on third parties without asserting their own legal rights or 
interests. See id. While an “aggrieved person does not necessarily have to be the person dis-
criminated against,” an FHA plaintiff must always satisfy constitutional standing require-
ments under Article III of the Constitution. See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 
F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2000); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Del. City, 983 F.2d 1277, 1282 n.6 
(3rd Cir. 1993). 
135 See Zimmerman & Cohen, supra note 112, at 56. 
136 429 U.S. 252, 271 (1977). 
137 Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147; Schmidt, 505 F. Supp. at 994. 
138 See 564 F.2d at 146–47. 
139 Id. at 147; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000). 
140 Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147. 
141 Id.; see 114 Cong. Rec. 3421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
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standard in all FHA claims.142 This amendment was rejected, as Senator 
Percy voiced the opposition’s concern about the virtually insurmount-
able burden it would impose on plaintiffs.143 
C. Discriminatory Effects Under the Fair Housing Act 
 The Supreme Court has not decided how courts should analyze 
whether a particular discriminatory impact constitutes a violation of 
the FHA.144 Lower courts have taken varied approaches.145 In Arlington 
Heights II, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that 
not “every action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal [un-
der the FHA].”146 In a move that was later followed by the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the Arlington Heights II court created a test to examine the follow-
ing factors: (1) how strong the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory 
effect is; (2) whether there is some evidence of discriminatory intent; 
(3) what the defendant’s interest is in taking the action complained of; 
and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks to either compel the defendant to 
affirmatively provide housing for minorities, or merely to restrain the 
defendant from interfering with individual property owners who wish 
to provide such housing.147 It seems counterintuitive that a test de-
signed to measure discriminatory impact alone would include the sec-
ond factor, which examines evidence of discriminatory intent.148 How-
ever, the court noted that the controversial second factor was the least 
important and that “too much reliance on this evidence would be un-
founded.”149 The Sixth Circuit has adopted a modified Arlington Heights 
II approach that completely abandons the second factor.150 
 The majority of the remaining circuits do not follow the multi-
factor approach of Arlington Heights II. Instead, they follow a prima fa-
cie approach, meaning that “proof of discriminatory effect alone is al-
ways sufficient to establish a violation of the [FHA].”151 In Huntington 
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit criticized the Arlington Heights II factors because they 
                                                                                                                        
142 114 Cong. Rec. 5221–22 (1968). 
143 Id.; see Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147. 
144 See Zimmerman & Cohen, supra note 112, at 56. 
145 See id. 
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“place[d] too onerous a burden on [plaintiffs].”152 It then noted that 
the legislative history of the FHA argues against such a “daunting . . . 
standard.”153 The chief difference between the multifactor and prima 
facie approaches involves the government’s burden of proof in justify-
ing its actions.154 In multifactor jurisdictions, plaintiffs bear the burden 
of demonstrating that the government can achieve its objectives 
through a less discriminatory alternative.155 In more lenient prima fa-
cie jurisdictions, the plaintiff establishes an FHA claim once proof of 
discriminatory effect is shown; the burden then shifts to the govern-
ment to prove first that its actions furthered, in theory and in practice, 
a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest, and second, that no al-
ternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory impact.156 
 All courts recognize two basic types of discriminatory effects.157 
First, a decision can have a greater adverse impact on one protected 
group than another.158 This type of discriminatory effect can be demon-
strated by statistical demographic information.159 The court in Hunting-
ton Branch, NAACP suggested that plaintiffs should focus on “propor-
tional statistics” instead of “absolute numbers.”160 In that case, although 
a greater number of whites were below the poverty line, nonwhites were 
proportionately poorer.161 The second type of discriminatory effect oc-
curs when a government policy perpetuates segregation.162 In United 
States v. City of Black Jack, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting the construction of any new 
multifamily dwellings.163 The court found that the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case was satisfied upon showing that exclusion of townhouses would 
“contribute to the perpetuation of segregation in [the city].”164 
                                                                                                                        
152 844 F.2d 926, 935–36 (2nd Cir. 1988). 
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D. Local Resident Preferences Under the Fair Housing Act 
 Even in jurisdictions that follow the more onerous multifactor test, 
plaintiffs have successfully used the FHA to invalidate bona fide resi-
dency requirements for affordable housing.165 In United States v. Hous-
ing Authority of Chickasaw, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
brought suit against the city of Chickasaw, Alabama for using a bona 
fide residency requirement in its public housing program.166 The DOJ 
provided statistical evidence that the residency requirement resulted in 
a public housing facility that never housed any African American ten-
ants despite being located in Mobile County, which had a large African 
American population.167 The district court found both types of dis-
criminatory impact: the residency requirement had a greater adverse 
impact on African Americans than whites since it had the effect of ex-
cluding all nonwhites, and the requirement perpetuated the segrega-
tion of the community because it discouraged neighboring African 
Americans from integrating into Chickasaw.168 
 Upon balancing the four Arlington Heights II factors, the Chickasaw 
court concluded that the city’s bona fide resident requirement violated 
the FHA due to its discriminatory effects.169 The court stated that it is 
required to “decide close cases in favor of integrated housing.”170 How-
ever, the court was careful to note that not all affordable housing resi-
                                                                                                                        
165 E.g., United States v. Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 716, 716 (S.D. Ala. 
1980). 
166 Id. at 726. 
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Though it noted there was no evidence of discriminatory intent, the court repeated a Sev-
enth Circuit opinion which stated that discriminatory intent need not be shown in order to 
prove a violation of the FHA. Id. In examining the city of Chickasaw’s governmental interest, 
the court did not mention whether there were less discriminatory alternatives available. See 
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169 Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. at 733. Interestingly, the DOJ also attacked the bona fide 
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732–33. However, because the case was decided on statutory grounds, there was no need for 
the court to go into Constitutional analysis. Id. at 733. 
170 Id. at 732 (quoting Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
2009] Local Preferences in Affordable Housing 229 
dency requirements are per se violations of the FHA; such policies may 
serve a valid public purpose.171 
V. The Legality of Local Resident and Employee Preferences in 
Affordable Housing 
 A local government that operates its affordable housing program in 
a manner that gives preference to local residents and/or persons em-
ployed within its boundaries risks offending the fundamental right to 
travel and migration, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fair Housing 
Act.172 The potential legal problems associated with both types of prefer-
                                                                                                                        
171 Id. at 731. Another case is helpful in understanding why a court would overturn a lo-
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jurisdiction. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 33 (D. Mass. 2002). 
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tive of the right to travel and migration, the Langlois complaint focused on a statutory FHA 
challenge. See id.; see also Fayerweather v. Town of Narragansett Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 19, 
19 (D.R.I. 1994). 
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43, 51 (1st Cir. 2000); see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(6) (2000). The court concluded that “[i]t is 
hard not to treat Congress’s own [permission] as justification enough to satisfy a statutory 
impact discrimination claim of the kind before us.” Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 
F.3d at 51. Absent express congressional permission, the district court’s invalidation of the 
resident preferences would presumably have been affirmed. See Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. at 
732. Thus, because there is no congressional authorization for local resident preferences in 
non-Section 8 and other municipal housing programs, the FHA appears fully capable of 
invalidating local resident preferences in local affordable housing programs. See id.; Langlois, 
234 F. Supp. 2d at 78. 
The FHA has also been used to invalidate employee preferences in affordable housing. 
In Davis v. New York City Housing Authority, the Second Circuit upheld a district court injunc-
tion against a working family preference due to its disparate racial impacts. 278 F.3d 64, 76, 
88 (2nd Cir. 2002). However, the preference was for working families in general, and did not 
favor local employees. See id. at 68–69. 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 93–96, 125–29, 166–71. A variety of state laws that 
could be implicated by local resident and employee preferences lie beyond the scope of this 
Note. See supra note 13. In addition, when funds from the U.S. Department of Housing and 
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ence, as well as suggestions for structuring lawful programs, are dis-
cussed below. 
A. Local Resident Preferences in Affordable Housing 
1. Right to Travel and Migration 
a. Durational Resident Preferences 
 Because courts apply strict scrutiny to durational residency re-
quirements, an affordable housing policy that grants preference to lo-
cal residents based on the length of their residency would almost cer-
tainly be challenged and overturned as violative of the fundamental 
right to travel and migration.173 It is true that a durational preference 
would be less onerous than an absolute requirement; depending on how 
the preference was implemented, such a policy would not completely 
deny the public benefit to outsiders or newly arrived residents.174 How-
ever, a durational resident preference would probably be invalidated 
for two reasons. First, following Saenz v. Roe, courts are not receptive to 
the argument that a policy only partially denies benefits to new resi-
dents and should thus be treated with more deference.175 Second, in 
the spectrum of durational residency requirements that have been 
challenged, a reviewing court would probably determine that afford-
able housing is a basic necessity, more similar to welfare and hospital 
care than divorce or in-state tuition benefits.176 Thus, under Shapiro v. 
Thompson and its progeny, a durational preference for local residents 
would be seen as a penalty on the fundamental right of outsiders to 
migrate to the challenged jurisdiction.177 A reviewing court would 
                                                                                                                        
Urban Development (HUD) or similar state agencies are used in an affordable housing devel-
opment, preferences may conflict with agency policies. See generally Henry Korman, Citizens’ 
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173 See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 618–19 (1969). 
174 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504–05 (1999). 
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176 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 419 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mem’l Hosp., 415 
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likely follow strict scrutiny and invalidate the durational preference 
upon determining that less restrictive means—such as local recruit-
ment and advertising schemes—are able to accomplish the govern-
mental purposes behind the preference.178 
b. Bona Fide Resident Preferences 
 Though courts have consistently upheld bona fide residency re-
quirements against challenges based on the right to travel and migra-
tion, a bona fide resident preference unaccompanied by some other 
broadening qualification could be invalidated.179 The chief reason that 
courts give deference to bona fide residency requirements is that “any 
person is free to move” to a locality and “establish residence” in order to 
receive a public benefit.180 Because all residents are eligible for the pub-
lic benefit without regard to length of residency, there is no penalty on 
nonresident travel or migration.181 However, affordable housing is 
unlike other public benefits. It is logically infeasible for a person to move 
to a locality unless they can first afford to live there. Bona fide residency 
preferences in affordable housing consequently pose an immense risk of 
deterring indigent nonresidents from migrating and establishing resi-
dency.182 Upon challenge, a reviewing court could determine that such 
preferences are prohibitively burdensome on low-income nonresidents’ 
fundamental right to travel and migration.183 
 Bona fide resident preferences should be structured as broadly and 
inclusively as possible in order to avoid potential challenges based on the 
right to travel and migration.184 In particular, resident preferences 
should be accompanied by local employee preferences and/or other 
broadening qualifications.185 In giving indigent nonresidents a legiti-
mate opportunity to receive affordable housing benefits through alter-
native processes, not merely residency alone, local governments would 
reduce the risk of deterring or penalizing migration.186 In Fayerweather v. 
                                                                                                                        
178 In Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority, the court mentioned that a local recruit-
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ments. See 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 70 (D. Mass. 2002). 
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Town of Narragansett Housing Authority, the court credited the breadth of 
the city’s affordable housing policy, which gave preference to both local 
residents and local employees.187 The court determined that such inclu-
sive preferences do not penalize or violate a nonresident’s right to travel 
and migration.188 In addition to having a local employee preference 
complement its local resident preference, a local government might also 
broaden its preferred applicant pool by extending affordable housing 
preferences to a geographic area beyond its jurisdiction.189 For instance, 
a city could grant preference to all persons who live or work in the sur-
rounding county.190 Expanded geographic preferences increase the like-
lihood that indigent nonresidents can become residents in order to 
qualify for the public benefit, thereby reducing the risk of deterring or 
penalizing nonresident travel and migration.191 
2. Equal Protection Clause 
 It is extremely unlikely that a local resident preference would be 
overturned for violating the Equal Protection Clause on the basis of dis-
criminatory effects.192 Indeed, it has never happened. While local resi-
dent preferences can clearly cause or perpetuate disparate racial im-
pacts, particularly in localities surrounded by greater racial diversity, 
equal protection jurisprudence requires a challenger to prove that the 
government was motivated by a desire to discriminate.193 In practical 
terms, the test expressed in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp. (Arlington Heights I ) demands that a plaintiff 
demonstrate purposeful discrimination through unexplainable and 
egregious disproportionate effects, obvious contextual circumstances, or 
statements of legislators.194 Only in the most exceptional of scenarios 
would this be possible.195 Courts are consequently hesitant to overturn 
                                                                                                                        
187 See 848 F. Supp. 19, 22 n.3 (D.R.I. 1994). 
188 Id. at 22. 
189 Korman, supra note 172, at 80; Gould, supra note 12, at 9. 
190 Korman, supra note 172, at 80; Gould, supra note 12, at 9. It is worth noting that if fed-
eral funds are involved in an affordable housing development, some federal regulations pro-
hibit geographic preference areas smaller than the local government itself. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. 
§ 5.655(c)(1) (2007) (Section 8 housing); 24 C.F.R. § 960.206(b)(1)–(3) (2007) (public hous-
ing); 24 C.F.R. § 982.207(b)(1)–(3) (2007) (multifamily housing); see also Korman, supra note 
172, at 39 n.29. 
191 See Korman, supra note 172, at 80; Gould, supra note 12, at 9. 
192 See supra notes 116–28 and accompanying text. 
193 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976); United States v. City of Black 
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing perpetuation of segregation). 
194 See 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977). 
195 See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
2009] Local Preferences in Affordable Housing 233 
facially neutral laws, such as local resident preferences, on the grounds 
that they violate the Equal Protection Clause.196 
3. Fair Housing Act 
 The FHA and other civil rights laws were originally enacted in or-
der to prevent discrimination against protected classes of people.197 
These same laws apply to local governments seeking to serve their own 
residents in affordable housing programs.198 Congress deliberately re-
moved from the FHA a plaintiff’s difficult burden of proving purpose-
ful discrimination that is present in equal protection claims.199 Instead, 
a plaintiff must only demonstrate that a local resident preference cre-
ates or perpetuates a discriminatory impact.200 Thus, of all the legal 
risks to local resident preferences discussed in this Note, an FHA claim 
is perhaps the easiest for plaintiffs to bring and the most difficult for 
local governments to defend.201 
 It is regrettable that residential segregation still characterizes many 
of America’s metropolitan regions.202 Discrimination takes numerous 
forms and comes from a variety of institutions.203 Overt harassment and 
violence, income inequality, exclusionary zoning, prejudiced mortgage 
lending, and bigoted home sales and rentals are just a few of the many 
practices that have contributed to modern residential segregation.204 
However, even the most blameless of local governments cannot ignore 
regional racial imbalances.205 When racial imbalances exist, the resulting 
discriminatory effects of a local resident preference can be obvious. In a 
predominantly white municipality, for example, a local resident prefer-
ence would disproportionately benefit whites while excluding other 
races from affordable housing.206 The preference would also perpetuate 
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existing segregation by discouraging neighboring nonwhites from inte-
grating into the municipality.207 
 An FHA claim against a local government’s resident preference is 
likely to succeed when the locality is significantly more homogenous 
than its surrounding region.208 In considering whether a local resident 
preference has a disparate impact, courts compare the demographics 
of the locality to the demographics of the surrounding region.209 In the 
FHA claim presented in Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority, the court 
borrowed a statistical test known as the “four-fifths rule,” which is used 
by the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
to measure disparate impact in employment practices.210 According to 
the four-fifths rule, “[a] selection rate for any race . . . which is less than 
four-fifths . . . (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the 
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement 
agencies as evidence of adverse impact.”211 This test can be a useful 
guideline for local governments as they monitor their affordable hous-
ing programs; however, there is ultimately no bright-line statistical test 
for determining disparate impact.212 Other courts have used somewhat 
different tests.213 
 Once a plaintiff has demonstrated that a local resident preference 
causes or perpetuates a disparate racial impact, courts take varying ap-
proaches in determining whether the disparate impact violates the 
FHA.214 The minority of courts adhere to the multifactor test outlined in 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Ar-
lington Heights II ).215 Under this test, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the government can achieve its objective through a 
less discriminatory alternative.216 Most courts follow a prima facie ap-
proach, meaning that the local government must justify disparate im-
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pacts by demonstrating that it has a compelling purpose and that no less 
discriminatory alternatives are available.217 Regardless of which party 
bears the burden, a plaintiff would likely be successful in arguing that 
local zoning and planning policies contribute to the unaffordability of 
housing; simply removing the zoning and planning policies would be a 
less discriminatory alternative and would allow unregulated growth to 
create affordable housing opportunities for residents and nonresidents 
alike.218 Such laissez-faire development would be highly undesirable for 
most local governments.219 
 The risk that local resident preferences will create or perpetuate a 
disparate impact, coupled with the difficulty of defending such an oc-
currence, should convince local governments that it is necessary to ex-
tend preferences beyond only current residents.220 As with right-to-travel 
concerns, local governments would be wise to extend preferences to 
households that have a member who works in the jurisdiction.221 Addi-
tionally, a locality could reduce the risk of a disparate impact by extend-
ing preferences to residents of a more diverse surrounding geographic 
area, such as a county.222 Expanded preferences increase the ethnic di-
versity of the preferred applicant pool, thereby reducing the risk of cre-
ating or perpetuating a disparate racial impact.223 
 Finally, it may be possible to mitigate a discriminatory impact 
through the use of partial preferences. For example, a local government 
could require developers to grant preference to local residents in fifty 
percent of their affordable housing set-asides, rather than the entire 
stock.224 Additionally, developers could be required to grant local resi-
dent preferences only when filling initial vacancies.225 Selection of sub-
sequent occupants could be based on income alone, without regard to 
residency.226 Both of these partial preferences would reduce the risk of 
creating or perpetuating discriminatory racial impacts.227 
                                                                                                                        
217 See id. 
218 See Lerman, supra note 4, at 386–88. 
219 See id. at 387. 
220 See Korman, supra note 172, at 77; Gould, supra note 12, at 9. 
221 See Gould, supra note 12, at 9. 
222 Korman, supra note 172, at 80; Gould, supra note 12, at 9. 
223 See Gould, supra note 12, at 9. 
224 Korman, supra note 172, at 79. 
225 Id. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. 
236 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:207 
B. Local Employee Preferences in Affordable Housing 
1. Right to Travel and Migration 
 Local employee preferences in affordable housing, by themselves, 
do not resemble any preferences that have ever been challenged as vio-
lating the right to travel and migration.228 Unlike residency preferences 
that risk preventing indigent nonresidents from migrating because they 
cannot afford to live in the jurisdiction—and consequently cannot re-
ceive preference in affordable housing—employee preferences are 
unlikely to offend the right to travel because employment is more easily 
attainable.229 Nonetheless, local employee preferences should be ex-
tended not just to persons currently employed in the jurisdiction, but 
also to persons who have offers of employment in the jurisdiction.230 
The inclusiveness of such a preference would reduce the risk of deter-
ring or penalizing nonresident migration, and would most likely receive 
deferential rational basis review if challenged.231 A local government 
would have a variety of reasonable justifications for local employee pref-
erences in affordable housing, including the desire to reduce traffic con-
gestion, long commute times, noise, poor air quality, and other negative 
environmental impacts.232 Preferences for employees in vital occupations 
could be justified by compelling public safety interests.233 
2. Equal Protection Clause 
 It is extremely unlikely that a local employee preference would be 
overturned for violating the Equal Protection Clause on the basis of dis-
criminatory effects.234 Not only would the discriminatory impact of em-
ployee preferences be less direct than resident preferences—which 
themselves probably could not sustain an equal protection claim—but 
the indirect racial impacts of employee preferences would make them an 
unlikely tool for bigoted legislators to use with the intention of exclud-
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ing a protected class.235 A court would be much more willing to find a 
violation of a civil rights statute, such as the FHA.236 
3. Fair Housing Act 
 Though less direct than local resident preferences in segregated 
regions, local employee preferences also risk creating and perpetuating 
disparate racial impacts in violation of the FHA.237 Even if local employ-
ers have hiring practices that are nondiscriminatory, a jurisdiction’s local 
employees can still be characterized by homogenous races or genders.238 
Likewise, vital civic occupations, such as teachers, police officers, and 
firefighters, frequently have a racial or gender makeup that is not wholly 
representative of the area’s demographics.239 In such cases, one or more 
groups may be able to challenge a local employee preference based on 
its disparate impacts.240 A challenger would have a persuasive argument 
that less discriminatory means are available to achieve the government’s 
purpose.241 Rather than giving preference to local employees in afford-
able housing, a government could provide low-interest loans and other 
fiscal inducements in exchange for employees’ commitments to live in 
the jurisdiction, a practice that is already common in many cities.242 Both 
multifactor and prima facie jurisdiction courts would have a difficult 
time ignoring such a less- discriminatory alternative.243 
 It is again imperative that local employee preferences be structured 
as broadly and inclusively as possible in order to avoid an FHA viola-
tion.244 In addition to expanding the preferred geographic employment 
area, a locality should also ensure that a broad swath of local employees 
is given preference.245 For instance, a preference for local teachers 
should be expanded to include all employees of the school district, in-
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cluding janitorial staff and other lower-wage earners.246 By increasing the 
diversity of preferred applicants, expanded employment preferences 
decrease the likelihood of creating or perpetuating disparate racial im-
pacts.247 
Conclusion 
 There is a growing trend of local governments allocating affordable 
housing set-asides in a manner that favors local residents and/or local 
employees. Such preferences are threatened by three chief legal princi-
ples. First, courts may view the preferences as a penalty on nonresidents’ 
fundamental right to interstate travel and migration. Second, if the pref-
erences are motivated by legislators’ desire to exclude a protected class 
of persons, courts may conclude that the preferences violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. Finally, local resident and employee preferences can 
violate the Federal Fair Housing Act by creating or perpetuating dis-
criminatory racial impacts. Such violations require no proof of discrimi-
natory intent on behalf of legislators. 
 In order to avoid these legal risks, local governments should struc-
ture their affordable housing programs as broadly and inclusively as pos-
sible. By offering multiple methods for an applicant to receive prefer-
ence—such as preferences based on bona fide residency, employment, 
and expanded geographic areas—and by limiting the scope and dura-
tion of the preferences, a local government would decrease the likeli-
hood of penalizing nonresident migration while simultaneously decreas-
ing the likelihood of creating or perpetuating discriminatory racial 
impacts. 
                                                                                                                        
246 See id. 
247 See id. It is also possible that local employment preferences could be challenged for 
creating a disparate impact upon disabled persons, who are another class of persons pro-
tected by the FHA. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2000). A disabled person may not be physically able to 
work in any occupation, or may not meet the high standards for a vital civic occupation. 
Under such a challenge, it would be difficult for the local government to maintain that it 
was not a plaintiff’s disability that disqualified her for the preference, but, rather, her em-
ployment status. A local government would probably be wiser to simply create a policy ex-
emption for disabled persons under its local employee preference. See Korman, supra note 
172, at 73–74. By also granting preference to disabled persons, a local government would 
avoid disparate disability impacts without significantly departing from the original intent of 
the preference. See id. 
